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INTRODUCTION
A great deal has been written about both international law and
government lawyering. I Most of it has focused on a government legal
adviser's duties to give confidential advice to his or her principal, Secretary,
Minister, or agency; his or her role in negotiation and litigation; and efforts
among legal advisers to develop national and international networks to improve
their effectiveness. Too little has been written about the crucial, overlooked
responsibility of government international lawyers to explain publicly their
government's international law rationale for its actions: what I call "The Legal
Adviser's Duty to Explain."
As I suggested five years ago, the Legal Adviser's Duty to Explain is a
loyalty that government legal advisers owe not just to their clients and ministers
2but also to their publics and national citizenries. Under this important
f Sterling Professor of International Law, Yale Law School; Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of
State, 2009-2013. This Essay grows out of a chapter from THE ROLE OF LEGAL ADVISERS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Andraz Zidar & Jean-Pierre Gauci eds., forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter Zidar &
Gauci] and remarks given at a conference held by the British Institute of International and Comparative
Law on February 26, 2015, at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, on the 100th
Anniversary of the Founding of the Grotius Society. The views expressed here are my own and do not
necessarily represent the views of any past or present employer. I am grateful to Daniel Bethlehem,
Sarah Cleveland, Joel Goldstein, Rebecca Ingber, Gerry Neuman, Alexandra Perina, Phil Spector and
Dakota Rudesill for their help and to Jacqueline Van De Velde, Yale Law '17, and Sophia Chua-
Rubenfeld, Yale Law '18, for their excellent research assistance.
I. See generally MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN
POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE
DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER (2010) [hereinafter SCHARF & WILLIAMS]; Antonio Cassese, The
Role of the Legal Adviser in Ensuring that Foreign Policy Meets International Legal Standards,
14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 139 (1992); Harold Hongiu Koh, The State Department Legal Adviser's Office:
Eight Decades in Peace and War, 100 GEO. L.J. 1747, 1754 (2012) [hereinafter Koh, Eight Decades]
(part of this Essay deriving from this article); Zidar & Gauci, supra note t.
2. See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks at the Annual
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transparency norm, senior government lawyers, and the Legal Adviser of the
foreign ministry, in particular, should be expected not just to give legal advice
in private but also to explain in public the international legal basis supporting
the action that their government has taken.
Fulfilling this duty is particularly important with respect to international
law. To participate in a system of international law, nations owe each other
explanations of why they believe their national conduct comports with global
norms and follows not from mere expedience but from a sense of legal
obligation (opinio juris). By laying out her government's legal theory in public,
the legal adviser shoulders the nation's responsibility to give its citizens, the
media, legal commentators, and legislators, as well as the international legal
community, a fuller opportunity to assess the legal theory offered to authorize a
given action and to test the government's present and future actions in light of
that theory.
This Essay explores the history and virtues of the Duty to Explain from
the perspective of America's national experience. In arguing for a Duty to
Explain, I generalize from my own experience as the twenty-second Legal
Adviser of the U.S. Department of State: an unusually large legal office whose
unique institutional history I and others have reviewed elsewhere. 3
Undeniably, other nations' legal advisers may operate under greater strictures
that prevent them from speaking as publicly as their American counterparts. In
some countries, public legal explanations traditionally come from only one
source-the office of the Prime Minister or the Attorney General, for example.4
I offer these thoughts in the hope that they will inspire other legal advisers and
international legal scholars to reflect on their own national experiences and to
offer their own national examples of how considered public legal explanation
can enhance the legitimacy and sustainability of controversial public actions. I
close by answering common objections to the notion of a public duty,
concluding that broader recognition and study of such a public Duty to Explain
would be both legally useful and politically prudent.
I. ORIGINS
For any United States government lawyer, discussion of a public Duty to
Explain begins with the historic opinion-giving function of America's Attorney
General.5 The United States Congress's First Judiciary Act, enacted in 1789,
famously created the Office of the Attorney General, a person "learned in the
law," charged with the duty "to give his advice and opinion upon questions of
law when required by the President of the United States, or when requested by
the heads of any of the departments, touching any matters that may concern
Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), http://wwwstate.gov/s//releases
/remarks/I39119.htm [hereinafter Koh Remarks at ASIL]; Koh, Eight Decades, supra note 1, at 1754.
3. See generally SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 1; Koh, Eight Decades, supra note I.
4. See, e.g., JOHN L. J. EDWARDS, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, POLITICS, AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 181 (1984) (discussing British practice regarding public legal explanations).
5. About DOJ, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/about (last visited Nov. 22,
2015).
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their departments. ' 6 As that office's workload multiplied, Congress passed the
Act to Establish the Department of Justice as "an executive department of the
government of the United States," with the Attorney General as its head.7
What was less clear was who was to opine authoritatively to other parts of
the U.S. government and the outside world regarding questions of international
law. For the first sixty years of the Republic, the early Secretaries of State-
Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and James Monroe-did their own
international legal work, as one might have expected from diplomats and
statesmen so well-versed in the law of nations. As the Statute of the
International Court of Justice came to acknowledge, "the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations [are treated] as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.' 8 The reasoning behind this rule,
historian Francis Wharton suggested in the mid-nineteenth century, was that
"the opinions of ... Secretaries of State, coupled with those of our Presidents
as to which they were naturally consulted, form a body of public law which
will stand at least on a footing of equality with the state papers of those of
foreign statesmen and jurists."9
By the mid-nineteenth century, "citizen-to-state claims"-claims by U.S.
citizens against foreign states and vice versa-had proliferated to the point that
they threatened to overwhelm the Secretary and his small staff. This led in 1848
to the creation of the position of "Claims Clerk," who would give legal advice
to the State Department with regard to such citizen-state claims, a job
superseded some twenty years later by the position of "Examiner of Claims."'
0
When the Department of Justice was established in 1870, the Examiner of
Claims was placed under the Attorney General's supervision. I But soon, the
Examiner's work extended beyond simple claims to such broader questions of
private and public international law as citizenship, the laws of war, and the
laws of prize, as well as boundary disputes and treaty interpretation.
By 1891, the Examiner of Claims had become known as the State
Department's "Solicitor," who-although still a Department of Justice
employee-functioned for four decades as an external law officer for the State
Department. On February 23, 1931, Congress enacted the Moses-Linthicumn
Act, which abolished the Office of the Solicitor and created the State
6. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 511-13).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 510, the Attorney General has now delegated to the Office of Legal Counsel, the
general counsel's office for the Department of Justice, responsibility for preparing the formal opinions
of the Attorney General and assisting the Attorney General in the performance of his core functions as
legal adviser to the President. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.25 (1988).
7. Act to Establish the Department of Justice, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (1870).
8. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33
U.N.T.S. 993.
9. A DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES TAKEN FROM
DOCUMENTS ISSUED BY PRESIDENTS AND SECRETARIES OF STATE, AND FROM DECISIONS OF
FEDERAL COURTS AND OPINIONS OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, at v (Francis Wharton ed., U.S. Gov't
Printing Office 1886) [hereinafter WHARTON'S DIGEST].
10. LegalAdvisers, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, https:/ihistory.state
.gov/departmenthistory/people/principalofficers/legal-adviser (last visited Jan. 6, 2016).
11. See Richard B. Bilder, The Office of the Legal Adviser: The State Department Lawyer and
Foreign Affairs, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 633, 634 (1962).
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Department's current Office of the Legal Adviser.12 The statute pointedly
spelled "Adviser" with an "e," paying homage to the position's ancestral
cousin: "The Legal Adviser" of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of Her
Majesty's Government.
Thus, at this writing, "L"-as the Legal Adviser's Office is commonly
known within the United States Government-and its ancestors have been for
nearly 170 years the Executive Branch's primary agent, authority, and focal
point for international law. In that capacity, L is charged with figuring out how
to formulate and implement the foreign policies of the United States in
accordance with international law and the responsible development of
international institutions. Among other duties, L helps determine how
international agreements should be crafted, how international organizations
should be structured, and how customary international law rules should be
interpreted and articulated.
As I have elsewhere summarized, the State Department's Legal Adviser
simultaneously plays many roles. Ideally, the Legal Adviser should act as an
independent, nonpartisan expert on and scholar of international law, with a
wide-ranging remit across the Department's entire workload, always giving
legal advice that is sensitive to the clients' policy objectives, taking the long
view, and seeking to advance the best long-term interests of the State
Department as an institution rather than the interests of any particular
individual or administration. These competing commitments require the Legal
Adviser to balance the concerns of politics and the law, to report directly to the
Secretary (with career lawyers in turn reporting directly to the Legal Adviser),
and to run an office of professional international lawyers that is kept in the loop
with regard to all departmental matters. L must be in at the takeoff of a new
foreign policy episode to help establish the legal and political legitimacy of the
actions that follow. At the same time, L must also stay connected to the outside
world, including the legal academy, which both reinforces the Legal Adviser's
Duty to Explain and underscores the capacity of U.S. Executive Branch
lawyers not just to interpret but more fundamentally to shape international law.
In all of this work, L plays many roles, not only as a desk-bound interpreter but
also as an action officer, negotiator, litigator, counsel to diplomatic litigation,
architect of new legal institutions, and at times arbiter of international legal
disputes. 13
While this compressed history explains the origins of the Legal Adviser's
confidential opinion-giving function, what is harder to trace is when this
function extended into a public Duty to Explain. As Kennedy Administration
Legal Adviser and Harvard Law Professor Abram Chayes put it, "whether we
[Americans] will profess to live by the law is not an issue of policy on which
we have alternatives. The answer is inherent in our national tradition, in our
culture, and it is implicit in our avowal at birth of 'a decent respect for the
12. Moses-Linthicum Act, Pub. L. No. 71-715, § 30, 46 Stat. 1207, 1214 (1931) (establishing
the Foreign Service of the United States of America).
13. Koh, Eight Decades, supra note I, at 1756-57.
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opinion of mankind."'"14 By so saying, Professor Chayes expressly invoked the
notion embedded in the U.S. Declaration of Independence, which obliged our
new nation-in paying "decent respect to the opinions of mankind"-to give
public reasons explaining to the world why its secession from England was
lawful and legitimate. 15 Thus, even at its founding, the United States perceived
a national obligation to make public the basis for its international legal actions.
The tradition of public explanation became prominent in the nineteenth
century, when British forces preemptively attacked forces on the American side
of the Saint Lawrence River. The ensuing negotiations in the Caroline case,
which led to the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, prompted then-U.S.
Secretary of State Daniel Webster, a distinguished lawyer and Supreme Court
advocate, to offer what has since become the classic international law definition
of self-defense: a government that claims self-defense as the justification of a
use of force must "show a necessity [that is] ... instant, overwhelming, leaving
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.'
16
By 1877, Assistant Secretary of State John Lambert Cadwalader-later
co-founder of the famous New York law firm Cadwalader, Wickersham &
Taft-had compiled a comprehensive Digest of the International Law of the
United States, taken from published Opinions of Attorneys General and the
leading decisions of the federal courts. 17 By 1886, Francis Wharton had
compiled an even more comprehensive Digest of the International Law of the
United States, taken not just from judicial decisions and Attorney General
opinions but also from historical documents issued by Presidents and
Secretaries of State. In Wharton's words, his Digest summarized "not merely
the messages of our Presidents, but the volumes, now nearly four hundred in
number, in which are recorded . . . the opinion of our Secretaries of State,"' 8
offering the U.S. government's official public legal rationales for a large
number of the U.S. government's historic actions.
In 1906, an extraordinary group of public figures-including former State
Department Solicitor James Brown Scott, President William Howard Taft,
former Secretary of State Elihu Root, Governor-Elect of Connecticut Simeon
Baldwin, former Ambassador to Great Britain Joseph Choate, millionaire
philanthropist Andrew Carnegie, and President Emeritus of Harvard Charles
Eliot-founded a learned society, the American Society of International Law,
14. Abram Chayes, Progress Towards International Law, 55 PROC. OF THE AMERICAN SOC'Y
OF INT'L L. AT ITS ANN. MEETING (1921-1969) 202, 205 (1961) (printing remarks made by Abram
Chayes on April 29, 1961, during his time as Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State).
15. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). Some twenty years later, I invoked the
Declaration's explanation to argue in support of the legality of Kosovo's Declaration of Independence
before the International Court of Justice. See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, on
behalf of the United States of America, Oral Observations of the International Court of Justice: On the
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, 4 (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/l 41
/1 5726.pdf.
16. Daniel Webster, Letter to Henry Stephen Fox, in I THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER:
DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1841-1843, at 58 (Kenneth E. Shewmaker ed., 1983).
17. WHARTON'S DIGEST, supra note 9.
18. Id. at iv-v.
2016]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 41:189
which the following year began the quarterly publication of the American
Journal of International Law. 19 One focus of the journal was to highlight
official U.S. government explanations of legal conduct. This point was
underscored in former Secretary of State Elihu Root's opening article in the
very first issue of the Journal in 1907, entitled "The Need of Popular
Understanding of International Law." 20 Root made explicit that public
explanation of international law arguments was critical to the popular
understanding necessary to ensure informed democratic oversight of national
conduct abroad: "The increase of popular control over national conduct, which
marks the political development of our time, makes it constantly more
important that the great body of the people in each country should have a just
conception of the international rights and duties.'
By so saying, Secretary Root prefigured what I have dubbed the concept
of "norm-internalization" as a central reason why nations obey international
Iaw22:
[T]he true basis of the peace and order in which we live is not fear of the policeman;
it is the self-restraint of the thousands of people who make up the community and
their willingness to obey the law and regard the rights of others.
23
Obviously, the people who make up the "international law community" cannot
exercise such self-restraint unless they understand-and accept as legitimate-their
government's public rationales for why particular actions 
are lawful.-'
Along with the quarterly publication of the American Journal, the public
tradition of presenting the U.S. government's international legal rationales
continued in the eight-volume work of John Bassett Moore, Wharton's
assistant, who first offered his own Digest in 1906. 25 Wharton's and Moore's
tradition of public explanation was then carried forward for decades first by the
Digests of International Law edited by long-time Legal Adviser (and later
International Court of Justice Judge) Green Hackworth and then by long-time
Assistant Legal Adviser and Counselor Marjorie Whiteman.26 By 1962, future
Professor Richard Bilder could write: "The number of international law
questions passed on by international or United States tribunals is probably no
more than a fraction of the number of such questions passed on by the Office of
19. See generally MARK W. JANIS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: GREAT EXPECTATIONS 1789-1914, at 152 (2004).
20. Elihu Root, The Need of Popular Understanding ofInternational Law, I AM. J. INT'L L.
1(1907).
21. Id.
22. Cf. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,
2601-02 (1997) (reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995) and THOMAS M. FRANCK,
FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1998)) (describing norm-internalization as the
key to a transnational legal process approach).
23. Root, supra note 20, at 2.
24. Cf. TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006) (arguing that people obey the
law because they believe it is legitimate, not because they fear coercion or punishment).
25. See JOHN BASSETT MOORE, 1906-14 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW; see also
JANIS, supra note 19, at 124 n.45.
26. See GREEN H. HACKWORTH, 1937-43 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW; MARJORIE
M. WHITEMAN, 1963-72 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
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the Legal Adviser in any equivalent period, and the types of such questions
considered by courts are generally of comparatively minor significance in the
broad context of international regulation."
27
As a general matter, the State Department's justifications continue to be
publicly available today in the Digest of the United States Practice in
International Law, published annually by the Office of the Legal Adviser.
28
Sometimes the legal rationales arc brief, and rarely are they tested before and
definitively resolved by courts. But as Abram Chayes argued, this tradition of
public justification has fostered both internal self-criticism and external
accountability over the years:
If there can be no determinate answer [in international law], analysis and criticism
can nevertheless distinguish a persuasive from a specious rationale, a responsible
and serious performance from a trivial one. In this way, the requirement of
justification provides an important substantive check on the leality of action and
ultimately on the responsibility of the decision-making process.
It. CONTROVERSIAL CASES
In my experience, government officials almost always believe their
actions are necessary, correct, and lawful. Providing a public justification is a
necessary step to explain why others should agree that actions taken by those
government officials are consistent with international law. As a prudential
matter, such public explanations prove to be critically important in bringing
along the rest of the country and prospective allies in establishing the
legitimacy of a public action. There is an understandable tendency to limit such
public explanations when the government action is controversial or when the
facts on the ground are changing quickly. But the more controversial the action,
the more a swift and thorough public explanation is needed, so that the media,
academic community, branches of government other than the executive, and
others who will be affected can assure themselves that the government action is
indeed justified under international law.
Still, the notion of a Legal Adviser's Duty to Explain raises delicate
questions of who, when, and what: who should give the public explanation,
when should it be given, and what should it address? While the Legal Adviser
of the State Department may be the logical person to address publicly the
international legal rationale for many foreign policy actions, depending on the
overlap with other agency's portfolios, other government legal advisers of
comparable rank, or their policy clients, may also end up publicly enumerating
these legal rationales. For example, over a five-year period, the Obama
Administration's legal rationale for America's post-9/11 use of force has been
publicly set forth in a series of speeches, including several by various agency
27. Bilder, supra note 1I, at 668.
28. See Digest of United States Practice in International Law, U.S. DEP'T STATE, http://
www.state.gov/s/I/c8183.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
29. ABRAM CHAYEs, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE
ROLE OF LAW 42 (1974).
2016]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 41: 189
general counsels.
30
The manner in which the legal adviser gives a public interpretation of the
United States's position under international law heavily depends on context and
role: particularly whether the Legal Adviser is playing the role of counselor,
conscience, defender, or spokesperson for his or her government on
international law. 31 The first two roles tend to be quiet ones. As a counselor,
like any other public or private general counsel, the Legal Adviser quietly gives
formal and informal legal advice to help clients achieve their policy objectives,
applying a complex admixture of law that includes U.S. constitutional
provisions, statutes, regulations, judicial decisions, past executive precedents,
treaty commitments, and customary international law. As a conscience, the
Legal Adviser gives prescriptive advice and strives not just to guide difficult
policy choices into lawful channels but also to suggest that certain choices may
be "lawful but awful," i.e., legally permitted but unwise or foolish as a matter
of policy. But as a defender or spokesperson, the legal adviser plays a more
vocal role. As a defender of U.S. interests, the Legal Adviser represents the
United States in treaty negotiations, diplomatic discussions, and international
litigation before all manner of international tribunals. In this role, the legal
adviser also coordinates daily with the Department of Justice on litigation
before domestic tribunals. And as spokesperson, the Legal Adviser speaks for
the U.S. government regarding the meaning and interpretation of a particular
issue of international law.
It is in these latter two capacities-defender and spokesperson-
particularly in complex, delicate, and contentious cases where legal issues
bleed into moral and policy issues, that a Legal Adviser's public statements
play a critical role in placing legal issues within their broader normative and
policy context. Clearly, the Legal Adviser need not and should not disclose
predecisional legal deliberations, which may jeopardize client confidences or
bona fide executive secrets. Legal opinions justifying covert action are
obviously matters of particular sensitivity, involving discretion. And on
occasion, there may be a need for a "cooling off' period after a policy decision
has been implemented before full public disclosure of the legal rationale seems
prudent. But as Professor Dakota Rudesill argues, there is and should be a
30. See, e.g., Stephen W. Preston, The Legal Framework for the United States' Use of Military
Force Since 9/11, at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law in Washington,
D.C. (Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606662 ("Although
a certain degree of secrecy is of course required to protect our country, the Administration has
demonstrated its commitment to greater transparency in matters of national security and, specifically, in
explaining the bases, under domestic and international law, for the United States' use of military force
abroad. We have seen this in the President's own speeches, for example, at the National Archives in
May 2009, at National Defense University in May 2013, and at West Point in May 2014. Among senior
Administration lawyers, we saw this early on, in a speech by the State Department's Legal Adviser at
ASIL in March 2010-this same meeting, five years ago--and in later speeches by the Attorney General
at Northwestern in March 2012, and by my predecessor as DoD General Counsel at Yale and at Oxford,
both in 2012 [and ... ] by the CIA General Counsel in remarks at Harvard Law School in April 2012.
My remarks here today are the latest in the series-an update of sorts-addressing the legal authority for
U.S. military operations as the mission has evolved over the past year or so.").
31. Koh, Eight Decades, supra note 1, at 1757-60.
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powerful government presumption against "secret law. ' ' 32 When a final policy
decision has been made and deemed lawful within the executive branch for a
particular set of reasons, prompt public disclosure of that legal analysis should
be the norm, not the exception. The default rule should be that in time,
executive branch legal opinions would be public and published, with whatever
redactions may be necessary to protect genuinely classified facts.
By so urging, I am endorsing something distinct from the so-called
"front-page rule," which was recently endorsed by the President's Review
Group on surveillance issues:
Th[e] informal precept, long employed by the leaders of US administrations, .
that we should not engage in any secret, covert, or clandestine activity if we could
not persuade the American people of the necessity and wisdom of such activities
were they to learn of them as the result of a leak or other disclosure.
33
The Legal Adviser's Duty to Explain extends further than such a
prudential rule, which essentially advises U.S. government officials not to do
anything that they could not defend in public. The Duty to Explain calls for
regular and routine open articulation of the legal rationale underlying particular
policy decisions. This strategy allows the administration's legal arguments to
be debated and gain legitimacy with the relevant publics, reassuring them that
the United States remains committed to acting consistently with the rule of law.
For example, Charlie Savage of the New York Times recently reported that four
government lawyers who gave legal advice regarding the targeted killing of
Osama bin Laden decided:
We should memorialize our rationales [in writing] because we may be called upon
to explain our legal conclusions, particularly if the operation goes terribly badly ...
We won't have time to articulate them with any care after the fact, and we want to
show that this was not post hoc rationalization. And it will further discipline our
thinking, and confirm that there is consensus, to write it down.3 4
Now that the existence of these secret legal opinions has been widely
reported, these same arguments would seem to cut in favor of the U.S.
government releasing the opinions supporting the killing of bin Laden.
35
The precise content of the public legal explanation will differ from case to
case. At a minimum, the content should be sufficient to assure the reader as to
why the United States government has concluded that its action is legal under
both domestic and international law. Admittedly, open articulation of a public
international law rationale does not always settle the distinct issue of domestic
legal rationale and only begins a public dialogue that may never be
conclusively resolved. But as noted above, the Duty to Explain is particularly
32. Dakota S. Rudesill, Coming to Terms with Secret Law, 7 HARv. NAT'L SECURITY J.
(forthcoming 2015).
33. See President's Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, Liberty
and Security in a Changing World 170 (Dec. 12, 2013), http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2013
/12/2013-12-12_rgfinalreport.pdf; Marty Lederman, The "Front Page Rule," JUST SECURITY BLOG
(Dec. 30, 2013, 9:40 AM), http://justsecurity.org/5 184/front-page-rule (noting the report's endorsement
of the rule and related media and practitioner discussion).
34. See, e.g., CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: INSIDE OBAMA'S POST-9/11 PRESIDENCY
263 (2015) (quoting then-CIA General Counsel Stephen Preston) (emphasis omitted).
35. See, e.g., id. at 260-66.
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important for international law arguments, given the central, constitutive role
that international law assigns to state practice. Customary international legal
norms can only be formed from a combination of state practice consistent with
the norm plus opinio juris (opinio juris sive necessitates): a belief by states that
they are following the norm out of a sense of legal obligation, not just because
of reciprocity, comity, morality, or political expediency. To capture this sense
of legal obligation, Article 38 of the Statute of the Court of International Justice
famously observed: "The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply . . .
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."
36
In these pages, Professor Rebecca Ingber, a former State Department
attorney, astutely described how executive branch interpretations of
international law often turn on the timing and the nature of the "interpretation
catalyst" 37-the event that triggers the interpretation. Professor Ingber argued
that whether and how the executive branch asserts an interpretation of its
obligations and authority under domestic or international law depends critically
upon the point at which that legal question makes entry into the
intragovernmental decision-making process. The scope, breadth, flexibility, and
even substance of the executive branch's position regarding its legal authority
may differ markedly depending on whether the context that first flags the
question for dispositive legal decision is, for example, litigation, a national
presentation to an international human rights body, or a public speech. Because
executive branch legal positions, once taken, tend to be sticky, these
"interpretation catalysts," or interpretation-forcing events, become critical
triggering moments that often decisively shape the executive's legal and policy
decision-making processes.
Interpretation catalysts arise most urgently and can affect the greatest
change in times of crisis. The substantive interpretations of international law
that emerge reflect a repeated interplay between legal substance and what I
have called "transnational legal process." 38 By demanding better legal process
to produce better legal substance, legal advisers can help their policymaker
clients develop a better policy option during times of crisis.
Perhaps the best-known, most extensively studied historical example
from U.S. practice has been the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. 39 Once U.S.
overflights observed Soviet Missiles inside Cuba, three unpalatable policy
options were presented for presidential decision: do nothing, undertake a
ground invasion (which was both illegal and controversial after the disastrous
Bay of Pigs fiasco), or launch a unilateral military strike. Through intensive
consultation with senior policymakers via the so-called "ExComm process,"
State Department Legal Adviser Abram Chayes, his Deputy Leonard Meeker,
36. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33
U.N.T.S. 993 (emphasis added).
37. Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking, 38
YALE J. INT'L L. 359 (2013).
38. Koh, supra note 22, at 2603.
39. See generally CHAYES, supra note 29 (discussing the Cuban Missile Crisis in great detail).
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and Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel Norbert Schlei
helped formulate a fourth option: a defensive "quarantine" approved by the
Organization of American States (OAS). 40 At the time, the defensive
quarantine option was roundly excoriated by international law scholars as too
closely resembling a "blockade," which would have required Security Council
approval under Article 42 of the U.N. Charter.41 But the quarantine approach
facilitated better policy, inasmuch as it walked the fine line between doing
nothing and avoiding nuclear conflict, while spurring back-channel
negotiations that brought the crisis to a stable conclusion. For that reason, over
a half-century, it has come to be seen not only as a reasonable international
legal interpretation but also as a legal opinion that facilitated the best policy
42
option.
Over the last half-century, participants have detailed exactly how the
legal opinion in the Cuban Missile Crisis emerged. On October 19, 1962, the
United States government learned that Soviet missiles were in Cuba. At 7:00
p.m. Eastern Standard Time that evening, Deputy Legal Adviser Leonard
Meeker delivered a paper to Secretary of State Dean Rusk's office concluding
that: (1) what was taking place in Cuba was not an "armed attack" against the
United States justifying measures of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter; (2) that, under the Rio Treaty of 1947, the Council of the OAS could
recommend that member states take measures to deal with the action as a threat
to "the peace of America," with such a recommendation qualifying as action by
a "regional organization" under Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter, and hence
not a violation of the prohibition on the use of force contained in U.N. Charter
Article 2(4); and (3) that harkening back to an October 1937 speech where




the naval interdiction of further Soviet missiles carrying missile components to
Cuba should not be called a "blockade," which implied belligerency or a state
of war, but rather a lawful "defensive quarantine." Although President Kennedy
did not detail his legal rationale in his famous speech on the night of October
22,44 Legal Adviser Chayes offered a full public version of the legal reasoning
in the State Department Bulletin about a month later.
45
40. See generally id. at 14-16 (discussing the legal debate around the "defensive quarantine"
concept).
41. See, e.g., Quincy Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546 (1963)
(discussing Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, which calls on the Security Council to "take such
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security[, which] may include demonstration, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces
of Members of the United Nations.")
42. See, e.g., Peter Spiro, Remembering Abe Chayes on the Cuban Missile Crisis, OPINIO
JUJRIS (Oct. 22, 2012), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/I 0/22/remembering-abe-chayes-on-the-cuban-missile
-crisis ("The quarantine decision might seem legally anodyne to us ... but it was controversial at the
time."). See generally GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILIP ZELIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1971); CHAYES, supra note 29; ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS: A
MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1969).
43. Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Quarantine" Speech (Oct. 5, 1937), in I PUBLIC PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 406, 410 (1941).
44. Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Build-Up in
Cuba, 2 Pub. Papers 806 (Oct. 22, 1952).
45. Abram Chayes, Law and the Quarantine of Cuba, 41 FOREIGN AFF. 550 (1963)
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As a law professor, Chayes later provided a detailed insider's account of
bow law had importantly constrained and channeled three key decisions made
during the crisis: the choices (1) whether to use a "quarantine," in lieu of
another response; (2) whether to seek an authorizing resolution from the OAS;
and (3) how to manage relations with the United Nations. In particular, Chayes
showed that the law was both a constraint upon and a justification for these
actions and provided the organizational structures within which these policy
decisions were made. Chayes concluded that the constraining force of Article
2(4) of the U.N. Charter significantly channeled the ultimate decision away
from an air strike or ground invasion and toward the eventual solution of a
defensive quarantine. Most relevant for present purposes, he argued for both
the intrinsic necessity and the instrumental wisdom of public legal justification
for this important and difficult foreign policy decision.
As an intrinsic matter, Chayes accepted Attorney General Robert
Kennedy's claim that "moral" considerations influenced the United States's
choice to avoid an air or ground invasion. "[L]egal norm and moral precept,"
he argued, "are two expressions of the same deep human imperative." 46 As an
instrumental matter, he observed that the international organizations to which a
nation resorts for moral and material support are both influenced by and shape
global public legal justification. Key American decision-makers thus "knew it
would be desirable to offer a strong legal justification for their action" 47 and
that a global perception of legality would be a significant factor "in generating
support for and neutralizing opposition to the United States."4 8 Thus, when
Soviet Ambassador Zorin told the U.N. Security Council, "I am not in an
American court of law, and therefore do not wish to answer a question put to
me in the manner of a prosecuting counsel," U.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson
retorted, "You are in the courtroom of world opinion right now."
49
To be persuasive, a public explanation of why a national decision
comports with international legal norms must explain both the requisite legal
processes and the legal standards offered to justify the decision. Because
pivotal decisions set crucial precedents, it is essential that the public
justification explain why relevant legal standards better support the option
chosen over other possible policy options. For example, Chayes describes the
United States's repeated confirmation that the "mere emplacement of ground-
to-ground Soviet missiles in Cuba was not an armed attack warranting use of
force in self-defence," reasoning that U.S. adoption of such an expansive notion
would trivialize the effort at legal justification and weaken objective legal
(containing a reprint of remarks first published in the State Department Bulletin). Chayes reports that a
Legal Adviser's Memorandum, reprinted as Appendix Ill to his book, was the "contemporaneous
official exposition of the [U.S.] government's legal position ... prepared over the night and morning of
22-23 October 1963." CHAYES, supra note 29, at 47. While it was not initially published, the
memorandum "became something of a best-seller," with some one thousand copies being distributed to
foreign governments and the press. Id. at 47-48.
46. CHAYES, supra note 29, at 40.
47. Id. at 68.
48. Id. at 85.
49. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES ET AL., 2 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS 1101 (1968).
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restraints on the use of force.
50
To take a second example, in May 1970, Legal Adviser John Stevenson
gave an important speech outlining the Nixon Administration's position on the
international legal justification for its military operations in Cambodia. s l As
Stevenson explained,
It is important for the Government of the United States to explain the legal basis for
its actions, not merely to pay proper respect to the law, but also because the
precedent created by the use of armed forces in Cambodia by the United States can
be affected significantly by our legal rationale.
52
As an historical matter, the legal correctness of Stevenson's speech has
been significantly challenged,53 but by laying out the Administration's legal
theory in a public forum, Stevenson made clear not only what legal authority
the United States was claiming but also what policy discretion the United States
was not claiming. By so doing, he gave American citizens and legislators, as
well as the international legal community, a fuller opportunity to assess the
U.S. legal theory and to test the government's actions in light of it.
Stevenson's Cambodia opinion is only one of many issued by the State
Department Legal Advisers over the years. 54 Admittedly, as time has passed,
other U.S. government legal offices have also begun to opine on international
legal issues. For example, in 1980, the Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice
Department accomplished an admirable feat of legal transparency, when it
published-with a detailed introduction and summary-the twenty-five legal
opinions that office had issued over the fifteen-month period that encompassed
the Iranian Hostages Crisis, many of them referencing important analyses of
international law.55 But as Scharf and Williams note:
Where a significant international law-related issue came within the special purview
of these other legal offices, the State Department lawyers are ordinarily expected to
work with their counterparts (and vice versa) through a "clearance process" in an
attempt to ensure that a single legal position would emerge. Where this proved not
possible, divergent legal opinions are presented to the President and Cabinet within56
the text of a decision memo ....
In such non-consensus situations, "the Principals," or even the President
himself, end up choosing which legal rationale they intend to follow. One
recent prominent example of President Obama-himself a former teacher of
constitutional law-choosing a controlling opinion from among divergent legal
50. CHAYES, supra note 29, at 23. Chayes notes that the United States declined to advance a
self-defense rationale because to do so could not credibly have legitimated U.S. conduct and "would
have signaled that the United States did not take the legal issues involved very seriously." Id. at 66.
51. John R. Stevenson, Statement of the Legal Adviser, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 933 (1970).
52. Id. at 935.
53. See, e.g., Richard A. Falk, The Cambodian Operation and International Law, 65 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1971).
54. For other examples, see generally SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 1.
55. 4A OPINIONS OF THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL 71-333 (1980). I should disclose here
that, under the supervision of Theodore B. Olson and Larry L. Simms, I worked on the compilation and
production of that special opinion volume, and the drafting of the Introduction and Summary, as an
attorney-advisor at the Office of Legal Counsel.
56. SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 211.
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views within his administration came when the United States continued its joint
military operation in Libya in 2011. 57
But history indicates that some of the most controversial legal positions
taken by the U.S. government occurred in cases in which L was cut out of the
decision-making process: "the 1980s mining of Nicaraguan harbors and armed
support for the 'contras,' the 1990 kidnapping of Dr. Alvarez-Machain from
Mexico, and . .. the adoption of the initial policies related to treatment of
'unlawful enemy combatants' detained in the aftermath of the attacks on
9/11 .,58
When, as in these notorious cases, 59 other legal offices that may be less
sensitive than the State Department to international legal and diplomatic
communities opine on difficult questions of international law, they may not
show sufficient awareness of the long-term precedential implications of their
interpretations.
Mindful of this historical record, as the State Department's Legal Adviser
during the first term of the Obama Administration, representing then-Secretary
of State Hillary Rodham Clinton I tried to fulfill the Legal Adviser's Duty to
Explain in a variety of ways. These included speeches at the annual meeting of
the American Society of International Law, congressional testimony,
6 1
lectures and articles,62 arguments and presentations before international legal
57. See Charlie Savage, 2 Top Lawyers Lost to Obama in Libya War Policy Debate, N.Y.
TIMES (June 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/world/africa/18powers.html. For further
discussion of that debate, see generally Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian
Intervention, 53 HOUS. L. REV. No. 4 (forthcoming 2016) (20th Annual Frankel Lecture Symposium,
with commentary by Professors Dawn Johnsen and Ashley Deeks).
58. SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 211-12. By way of comparison, Sir Frank Berman,
a former UK Legal Adviser, noted:
Probably the most notorious incident where the UK Legal Adviser was deliberately cut out of the loop
was the 1956 Suez invasion .... [But now i]t is considered a cardinal sin within the UK Foreign Office
to put up a policy submission that did not clearly recite that the Legal Adviser or his staff had been
consulted, or which did not include an analysis of the legal questions which were relevant to the
decision. Id. at 212.
59. For discussion of the mining of the harbors of Nicaragua during the Reagan
Administration, which was undertaken by the CIA without input from the Legal Adviser's Office, see id.
at 60 (recounting the recollections of Davis Robinson, the Legal Adviser from 1981 to 1985). For
discussion of the Alvarez-Machain case, see id. at 92-93. For discussion of L's exclusion from the issue
of legal treatment of detainees after 9/11, see id. at 129-30 (recounting the recollections of William H.
Taft IV, the Legal Adviser from 2001 to 2005, criticizing a January 9, 2002, memorandum by John Yoo,
then-Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice, as
"seriously flawed" and noting that the Justice Department conclusions "are actually incorrect as well as
incomplete."); and id. at 2.
60. See, e.g., Koh Remarks at ASIL, supra note 2; Harold Hongju Koh, Statement Regarding
Syria, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/187163.htm.
61. See, e.g., Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations,
112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State)
[hereinafter Koh Libya Testimony]; Harold Hongju Koh, Statement Regarding Use of Force in Libya,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Mar. 26, 2011), http://www.state.gov/s//releases/remarks/l59201 .htm.
62. Harold Hongju Koh, Foreign Official Immunity After Samantar: A United States
Government Perspective, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1141 (2011); Harold Hongju Koh, International
Criminal Justice 5.0, 38 YALE J. INT'L L. 525 (2013); Harold Hongju Koh, International Law in
Cyberspace, 54 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2012); Harold Hongju Koh, Remarks: Twenty-First Century
International Lawmaking, 101 GEO. L.J. 725 (2012); Harold Hongju Koh & Todd F. Buchwald, The
Crime of Aggression: The United States Perspective, 109 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (2015). The most recent
two, published after I left office, nevertheless represented cleared U.S. government positions.
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and human rights bodies, 63 and, at times, blog posts regarding important
international legal events.64 In offering these public explanations, I saw my
audience as not just the general public, the media, and the academic community
but also "the invisible college of Legal Advisers. ' '65 This "invisible college"
includes other government lawyers from international law-respecting nations,
who need to explain to their own government clients whether or not to support
the U.S. legal justification for its actions in cutting-edge situations, for
example, with respect to the use of armed drones or cyber conflict.
Finally, almost as important as the legal analysis offered is a complete
statement of the contemporaneous facts on which the legal opinion is based.
Outsiders cannot fully evaluate the lawfulness of any state's conduct until they
know the precise factual circumstances under which it chooses to take action.
Controversial legal opinions are often issued under severe time pressure and
based on information that is fast-changing and only partially available to the
general public. Twenty-four hours can bring radical changes in the relevant
facts. Accordingly, it is especially important that the public legal rationale
carefully distinguish the legal question-given the stated facts, is the policy
option being considered available to policymakers under domestic or
international law?-from the policy question: under these factual
circumstances, would it be wise for policymakers to resort to that option?
Given the multiplicity of legal actors within any government, a
government's legal rationale may sometimes be gleaned from several sources.
But what ultimately matters is not from which office the explanation emanates,
but that at some publicly available place there be a complete version of the
"official legal story." Thus, I do not believe that the requirement of a public
Duty to Explain is met, for example, by having unnamed "senior government
officials" leak talking points to newspaper reporters or the blogosphere. In
order for the legal arguments to be understood, analyzed, and contested by
knowledgeable lawyers and commentators, it is crucial that the government
issue and "own" a public legal analysis as the government's official legal
63. See Harold Hongju Koh, Reflections on the Law and Politics of the Kosovo Case, in THE
LAW AND POLITICS OF THE Kosovo ADVISORY OPINION 350 (Marko Milanovi6 & Michael Wood eds.,
2015).
64. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The Lawfulness of the U.S. Operation Against Osama bin
Laden, OPINIO JURIS (May 19,2011, 6:00 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/05/19/the-lawfilness-of-the
-us-operation-against-osama-bin-laden. Other positions that I did not publicly release were nevertheless
found and released by the media after I left office. See, for example, Memorandum Opinion on the
Covenant Against Torture and Its Application in Situations of Armed Conflict from Harold Hongju Koh,
Legal Adviser, U.S Dep't of State (Jan. 21, 2013), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1 053901
-state-department-cat-memo.html, which was discussed in Charlie Savage, U.S. Seems Unlikely to
Accept That Rights Treaty Applies to Its Actions Abroad, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www
.nytimes.com/2014/03/07/world/us-seems-unl ikely-to-accept-that-rights-treaty-applies-to-its-actions
-abroad.html; see generally Marko Milanovic, Harold Koh 's Legal Opinions on the US Position on the
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, EJIL:TALK! (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk
.org/harold-kohs-legal-opinions-on-the-us-position-on-the-extraterritorial-application-of-human-ights
-treaties; and Memorandum Opinion on the Geographic Scope of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights from Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S Dep't of State (Oct. 19, 2010),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1053853-state-department-iccpr-memo.html.
65. Cf Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72 Nw. U. L. REV.
217 (1977) (describing the professional community of professors, students, government officials, and
international civil servants who focus on international legal issues).
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position in every difficult or important case.
To illustrate, take one recent area where I believe that the United States
has failed to fulfill its Duty to Explain: the collective use of humanitarian force.
In 1999, NATO famously took military action in Kosovo against Serbian
atrocities, without express Security Council authorization. As Sir Adam
Roberts noted, Kosovo perplexed
[I]awyers [who] tend to like a world of clarity, where an action can be distinctly
categorised as legal or illegal .... [But i]n reality, because contradictory principles
were inescapably at the heart of this crisis, there was no definitive legal answer that
could satisfy a convincing majority of the world's peoples, governments or even
international lawyers.
6
As U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor during Kosovo, I watched as nineteen NATO members accepted the
legality of some form of humanitarian intervention without U.N. Security
Council approval.
In October 1998, the United Kingdom publicly declared the legality of
the operation, "so long as the proposed use of process is necessary and
proportionate to the [humanitarian] aim and is strictly limited in time and scope
to this aim." 67 Seventeen other NATO members individually satisfied
themselves of the legality of their participation in the operation. 68 But
curiously, the United States government never articulated a legal justification
condoning its NATO actions, instead relying upon an amorphous listing of
factors that together justified the intervention as a matter of policy. 69 Then-
Secretary-General Kofi Annan captured the United Nations' ambiguity about a
narrowly tailored form of humanitarian intervention in situations of great
extremis by issuing a statement that recognized occasions when force might be
necessary, catalyzing the ongoing international legal movement to explore
affirmatively whether there is an international Responsibility to Protect
(R2P).7
The Clinton Administration's failure to articulate a clear legal rationale
for its Kosovo intervention came back to haunt the Obama Administration
fourteen years later, when the United States again failed to adequately to
discharge its Duty to Explain. The Obama Administration received
unmistakable proof that the Syrian leader Assad had launched a deliberate
chemical assault on innocent civilians after President Obama had warned that
66. See Adam Roberts, NATO's 'Humanitarian War' over Kosovo, 41 SURVIVAL 102, 105
(1999). See generally Koh, supra note 57 (discussing this issue in detail).
67. UK FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, FRY/KoSOVO: THE WAY AHEAD; UK VIEW
ON THE LEGAL BASE FOR USE OF FORCE (Oct. 7, 1998).
68. See, e.g., the Oral Pleadings of the Kingdom of Belgium before the International Court of
Justice in Legality of Use of Force (Serb. v. BeIg.), Verbatim Record (May 10, 1999, 3 p.m.) (arguing
that NATO's use of force was lawful). See generally Roberts, supra note 66, at 104.
69. See Michael J. Matheson, Justification for the NATO Air Campaign in Kosovo, 94 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 301 (2000).
70. See Chelsea O'Donnell, The Development of the Responsibility to Protect: An Examination
of the Debate Over the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 557, 560-
63 (2013).
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such an act would cross a "red line.",7 1 Significantly, President Obama had
announced four years earlier in his December 2009 Nobel Prize acceptance
speech that "I believe that force can be justified on humanitarian grounds, as it
was in the Balkans, or in other places that have been scarred by war." 72 But in
2013, the question became how best to back up those words with meaningful,
lawful action. The Arab League endorsed international action but shied away
from approving "all necessary measures," making it difficult to invoke the U.N.
Charter Article 52 "regional organizations" route to skirting a Russian veto that
had been famously deployed during the Cuban Missile Crisis.73 The British
Attorney General issued a post-Kosovo legal opinion indicating that
humanitarian intervention without Security Council resolution could be lawful
under international law, but the Prime Minister failed to secure parliamentary
support for intervention.
74
Faced with this weak support abroad and at home, President Obama
pushed the pause button not once, but twice: first saying on August 30, that
instead of using the previously threatened military force, he would seek prior
approval from a distracted and divided Congress when he plainly had not
secured the necessary House votes. Three weeks later, he postponed
indefinitely that congressional vote-which he likely would have lost-in order
to pursue diplomatic alternatives that remain ongoing.
75
To my knowledge, the only public legal position the U.S. Government
offered on the legality of intervention in Syria was a quote by the White House
Counsel to the New York Times, which explained that, while an attack on Syria
"may not fit under a traditionally recognized legal basis under international
law," given the novel factors and circumstances, such an action would
nevertheless be "justified and legitimate under international law" and so not
prohibited.76 As a matter of domestic law, the Administration also apparently
concluded that congressional approval was not required: "administration
lawyers decided that it was within Mr. Obama's constitutional authority to
carry out a strike on Syria as well, even without permission from Congress or
the Security Council, because of the 'important national interests' of limiting
regional instability and of enforcing the norm against using chemical
71. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps (Aug.
20, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house
-press-corps.
72. President Barack Obama, Nobel Lecture: A Just and Lasting Peace (Dec. 10, 2009), http://
www.nobelprize.org/nobel prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lecture-en.html.
73. Major Powers Hold UN Talks on Syria, AL JAZEERA AMERICA (Aug. 28, 2013),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/8/28/uk-to-asksecuritycounciltoauthorizenecessarymeasuresin
syria.html.
74. Joshua Rosenberg, Syria Intervention: It May Not Be Wise, But Using Force May Be
Lawful, GUARDIAN (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/aug/28/syria-intervention
-force-lawful.
75. Ernesto Londofio, Obama says U.S. Will Take Military Action Against Syria, Pending
Congress's Approval, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national
-security/obama-set-to-speak-on-syria-in-rose-garden/2013/08/31/65aea210-125b- 11 e3-85b6
-d27422650fd5 story.html.
76. Charlie Savage, Obama Tests Limits of Power in Syrian Conflict, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/09/world/middleeast/obama-tests-limits-of-power-in-syrian
-conflict.html (quoting White House Counsel Kathy Ruemmler).
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weapons. 77 The White House Counsel stated that
[t]he president believed that it was important to enhance the legitimacy of any
action that would be taken by the executive ... to seek Congressional approval of
that action and have it be seen, again as a matter of legitimacy both domestically
and internationally, that there was a unified American response to the horrendous
violation of the international norm against chemical weapons use.
Plainly, a legal opinion of such significance should have been laid out
somewhere other than in a newspaper quote. Given the importance of the issue,
the Obama Administration failed to fulfill its Duty to Explain by not issuing a
detailed legal opinion elaborating the White House view. Threatening military
action in Syria without stating a public legal rationale creates a dangerous
precedent. As Abram Chayes argued after the Cuban Missile Crisis, "[f]ailure
to justify in terms of international law warrants and legitimizes disapproval and
negative responses from other governments participating directly in the
process." 79 In the future, other less-humanitarian minded states can cite
President Obama's 2013 threat to put their own broad spin on the legal
interpretation using the murky concepts of humanitarian intervention and R2P
for their own self-interested purposes. In both the Kosovo and Syria cases, the
President's lawyers should have explained-not just in lay terms, as President
Obarna himself did, but in legal language that international lawyers can debate
(as the United Kingdom's Attorney General did in Syria and in Kosovo) how
humanitarian intervention without a Security Council resolution could be
lawful under international law.
80
III. ANSWERING OBJECTIONS
Let me respond to three basic arguments that have been offered against a
public Duty to Explain: first, that when facts are classified, the need for secrecy
overwhelms the need for public explanation of the government's legal
rationale; second, that there are cutting-edge situations-for example,
Responsibility to Protect (R2P)-where it may be better to offer no legal
rationale at all but instead to call the action "illegal, but legitimate"; and, third,
that at important times, the Legal Adviser's duty of loyalty to his or her client
may trump the Duty to Explain and militate against public disclosure of legal
advice.
The first common argument offered against public explanation is that the
operation under consideration may be covert or that key facts may be classified.
But recently, State Department attorney Alexandra Perina comprehensively
rebutted that claim by clarifying how international law-making processes are
negatively affected when a state acts covertly and that covert conduct later
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. CHAYES, supra note 29, at 44.
80. Andr6 Nollkaemper, Intervention in Syria and International Law: Inside or Out?, OPINIO
JURIS (Sept. 1, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/09/0 I /syria-insta-symposium-andre-nollkaemper
-intervention-syria-international-law-inside; see also Koh, supra note 57 (outlining such an argument).
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comes to public light.81 Perina acknowledges that states may act covertly for a
range of legitimate political, diplomatic, and strategic reasons and that, at
times, covert behavior may be consistent with international law. But she argues
that "covert actors' non-engagement in public discourse distorts the landscape
of evidence that informs other actors' legal judgments." Where states view their
conduct as lawful, acting covertly diminishes their ability to reinforce or
develop the law, "ceding that ground to third parties."82 Thus, for example, the
acting state cedes to the media the task of developing the public factual
narrative that drove the action.
Take, for example, the highly publicized case of Anwar Al Aulaqi, a key
leader of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) who was reported killed
in September 2011.83 Initially, the Obama Administration refused to
acknowledge its role in the death, even while releasing numerous public facts
about Al Aulaqi's leadership role in furtherance of attacks on American
citizens. 84 But after resisting for two years acknowledging its role in the lethal
action, the U.S. government finally acknowledged a role in his death and
offered a legal justification. By then, widespread and often inaccurate claims
had been made about the lack of limits on the Administration's theory of when
it was lawful to use a drone to target a U.S. citizen-leader of an opposing
terrorist force. The net result was that the U.S. government's legal case was
made late-and, in important senses, inaccurately-by piecemeal release of a
mosaic of legal arguments. Far preferable would have been a thorough and
authoritative recitation of the facts and legal arguments comprising the U.S.
government's legal case for deploying a particular counterterrorism technique.
At one point, the Administration released a sanitized White Paper that
presented the legal arguments without accompanying facts.85 But the problem
with this approach, as Perina notes, is that "there may be legitimate skepticism
about the credibility and weight that statements of legal principle can bear
when sanitized of facts and divorced from acknowledged conduct-that is,
whether they are merely 'cheap talk."' 86 Perhaps worst of all, the absence of a
contemporaneous public legal explanation can give the impression that the
President is claiming broader, more flexible, and far-reaching authority than he
actually intends, permitting commentators and even presidential candidates to
assert inaccurately that the President was asserting a right to kill Americans
with drones, anywhere, anytime, including on U.S. soil.87 Future decision-
81. Alexandra H. Perina, Black Holes and Open Secrets: The Impact of Covert Action on
International Law, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507 (2015).
82. Id. at 507.
83. See generally SCO1r SHANE, OBJECTIVE TROY: A TERRORIST, A PRESIDENT, AND THE
RISE OF THE DRONE (2015); see also Savage, supra note 34, at 233-54 (discussing legal memos
regarding Al Aulaqi).
84. Perina, supra note 81, at 544.
85. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, WHITE PAPER, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED
AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA'IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED
FORCE 1-2 (Nov. 8, 2011) [hereinafter DOJ WHITE PAPER], http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files
/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/dept-white-paper. pdf.
86. Perina, supra note 81, at 559 n.200.
87. Transcript: Rand Paul's Filibuster of John Brennan's CIA Nomination, L.A. TIMES (Mar.
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makers need to know the facts on which particular opinions are based, so that
they can analogize from precedents and note when a prior decision may not
provide good precedent for a current problem.
By 2014, a federal appeals court had found that the U.S. government's
official disclosure of its legal White Paper in the A] Aulaqi case amounted to a
waiver of privilege about its legal theory underlying certain lethal
counterterrorism operations. 88 The court accordingly ordered the U.S.
government to disclose parts of a highly classified Justice Department legal
memorandum. The net result was that the U.S. government made its legal case
too little, too late. It was forced to release, three years after the fact, a legal
opinion that it could have made public at the time that the lethal action had first
become widely known. By refusing to do so, it missed the critical opportunity
to build domestic and international support for its international legal position.
Nor did the claim of needed secrecy strengthen the persuasiveness of the U.S.
government's legal arguments. To the contrary, the implication was that the
U.S. did not come clean because it had something to hide. As Perina notes,
Unacknowledged conduct has an inherently corrosive effect on the law by casting
doubt on whether the operative legal rules have obligatory effect, potentially
contributing to the rules' desuetude .... [Thus, even as] States continue .. often
legitimately, to act covertly and maintain secrecy over aspects of their conduct ....
[they must] understand the legal consequences and costs of secrecy and covertness,
in order to manage their programs more strategically and potentially mitigate some
of the pernicious effects [of secrecy] on the law.
89
A second objection to a public Duty to Explain is that some action-such
as the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo--is better justified not as lawful per
se, but rather, as "illegal but legitimate. ' 9° This argument strikes me as a
failure of lawyerly responsibility, which we would never accept in other legal
situations. After all, do courts tell ambulance-drivers who run red lights to
prevent deaths that their actions are illegal because they might encourage
ambulance-chasers to do the same thing? Did we tell same-sex or different-race
couples that if they marry, they should consider those statuses permanently
"illegal but legitimate"? Did we tell battered spouses that if they protect
themselves in self-defense that their self-protective actions are "illegal but
legitimate"? The answer, of course, is no. Instead, in such difficult
circumstances where the law is ill-defined, we use the lessons of history to help
define the contours of an emerging lawful exception to an overly rigid
prohibition. In the case of a justified violation of a traffic rule, for example,
responsible lawyers craft a narrow "affirmative defense" that would render
lawful otherwise illegal behavior.
7, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/07/news/la-pn-transcfipt-rand-paul-filibuster-20130307
(quoting Senator Rand Paul's incorrect assertion that the President's theory "[tlhat Americans could be
killed [by a drone] in a caf6 in San Francisco or in a restaurant in Houston or at the home in Bowling
Green, Kentucky").
88. N.Y. Times v. Dep't of Justice, 752 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2014).
89. Perina, supra note 81, at 508.
90. See, e.g., Michael Ignatieff, How to Save the Syrians, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Sept. 13,
2013), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/sep/13/how-save-syrians/.
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To be concrete, such an approach should have been taken by the United
States with regard to the lawful uses of humanitarian intervention. I have
detailed elsewhere how a lawful way to use force in Syria could have been
found under both domestic and international law.91 Like former British Legal
Adviser Sir Daniel Bethlehem, I believe that "[i]n the case of the law on
humanitarian intervention, an analysis that simply relies on the prohibition of
the threat or use of force in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and its related
principles of non-intervention and sovereignty, is overly simplistic." 92 In
Kosovo, by comparison, without formally embracing NATO's legal position,
Professor Louis Henkin enumerated four factors that would support the legality
of collective military action in exceptional circumstances, e.g., without Security
Council authorization: extreme gravity of the human rights situation, collective
humanitarian action, prior Security Council unavailability, and subsequent
Council monitoring. 93 As Professor Henkin noted at the time, these are
"lawmaking moments," when instead of ducking public explanation, our
governments should address such questions head-on, as the British government
did with respect to the legality of humanitarian intervention in both Kosovo and
Syria.
94
A third unpersuasive argument lodged against a public Duty to Explain
international legal positions is that it would create a conflict of interest with the
private Duty of Loyalty that a government lawyer necessarily owes to his
clients and ministers. I do not deny that a tension sometimes arises, but in my
experience, rarely does it rise to the level of actual conflict of interest.
Admittedly, there may be times when the doctrines of attorney-client privilege,
executive privilege, or deliberative process privilege may weigh against
immediate public disclosure of a legal rationale, particularly if forces are at risk
or facts on the ground are rapidly changing.95 But this is only an argument for
keeping government legal opinions secret temporarily, not permanently.
As a public official who swears a solemn oath to uphold the Constitution
and law of the United States, the Legal Adviser owes broader loyalties than just
to his or her immediate policy clients. With respect to international law, the
91. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 57; Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian
Intervention (Part I. Political Miscues and U.S. Law), JUST SECURITY BLOG (Sept. 26, 2013),
https://www.justsecurity.org/l 158/koh-syria; Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian
Intervention (Part II. International Law and the Way Forward), JUST SECURITY BLOG (Oct. 2, 2013),
https://www.justsecurity.org/1506/koh-syria-part2; Harold Hongju Koh, 'Syria and the Law of
Humanitarian Intervention', Part III -A Reply, JUST SECURITY BLOG (Oct. 10, 2013), https://www
.justsecurity.org/1863/syria-law-humanitarian-intervention-part-iii-reply/. Much of the discussion in text
derives from the preceding sources.
92. Daniel Bethlehem, Stepping Back a Moment - The Legal Basis in Favour of a Principle of
Humanitarian Intervention, EJIL:TALK! (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/stepping-back-a-moment
-the-legal-basis-in-favour-of-a-principle-of-humanitarian-intervention/.
93. Louis Henkin, Editorial Comments, NA TO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo and the Law of
Humanitarian Intervention, AM. J. INT'L L. 824, 826 (1999) ("Is it better to leave the law alone, while
turning a blind eye (and a deaf ear) to violations that had compelling moral justification? Or should
Kosovo move us to push the law along to bring it closer to what the law ought to be?").
94. Id. at 827.
95. For a comparative law discussion of privileges associated with government legal advice,
see Matthew Windsor, Government Legal Advisers Through the Ethics Looking Glass, in LAW IN
POLITICS, POLITICS IN LAW (David Feldman ed., 2013).
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need to establish opinio juris cuts in favor of legal advisers explaining their
clients' international legal positions to a broad array of external constituencies:
Congress, the public, foreign governments, intergovernmental organizations,
and nongovernmental organizations. Having the President's own lawyers
personally and publicly delivering the Administration's legal position makes
crystal clear that politically accountable decision-makers, not just the career
civil servants, have concluded that their government's action comports with the
rule of law.
A legal adviser's greatest tension comes in balancing loyalties: loyalty to
clients and felt duties to the international law the lawyer is sworn to uphold.
Legal advisers seek to bring a blend of independence, expertise, and creativity
in solving problems and promoting the rule of law. The task of promoting
multilateralism is woven into the fabric of the legal adviser's daily work. Legal
advisers are, by their nature, engaged in multiple dialogues: conversations with
foreign colleagues about common problems and multilateral solutions;
interagency conversations about international law with colleagues across their
national government; conversations with the legal academy and learned
societies, such as the American Society of International Law; and internal
conversations with office colleagues that promote repeated examination of the
office's precedents and practices. The legal adviser's greatest challenge is to
balance the imperatives of politics and law and to make legal judgments that
are politically savvy without becoming overly politicized. As in the Cuban
Missile Crisis, skilled government lawyers can help identify lawful channels
through which difficult policy decisions can flow and to shape legal
instruments through which policy goals can be pursued.
In the end, as Legal Adviser, I tried to follow two commonsense rules.
The first is commonly known as "the airplane rule": to be in on the landing, the
legal adviser must be "in at the takeoff' of any new foreign policy episode in
order to help establish the legal and political legitimacy of the actions that
follow.96 As Abe Chayes once explained, law is not self-activating; for law to
influence meaningfully the path of government decision, the lawyers must be
brought in early, and then kept in the loop:
[I]t was very important for both the validity of the [U.S. government's] decision, the
subsequent justification, and the mobilization of support that the legal
considerations were taken fully into account during the decision-making process.
Somebody did not just make the decision and then call the lawyer in and ask the
lawyer to cook up some sort of legal theory to defend it.
97
The second rule is what Harvard President Derek Bok once called "the
96. See SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 60 (quoting Davis Robinson saying "I would
argue strongly that if L had been involved in the take-off in the case of the mining of the harbors of
Managua, we could have provided constructive advice .... The input of L would, I believe, have added
a significant dimension to the decision-making process and also improved the implementation of the
President's ultimate decision. However, as it transpired, instead of being ready for the fire storm that
followed the public disclosure of the mining of the harbors, the Administration was legally caught
offguard. Thus, all that the lawyers could contribute was assistance in after-the-fact containment of a
train wreck.").
97. Living History Interview with Abram Chayes, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 459,
480 (1997).
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pinball rule": if pinball players do not shake the machine, he said, they are not
really playing. But if they tilt the machine, they are not good players either. So
the rule the best players follow is "shake it, but don't tilt it." The same applies
here. For government legal advisers, this means proactively engaging and
constantly challenging the policy process, but striving not to bring the policy
process to a screeching halt unless the law requires it.
CONCLUSION
All of this is easier said than done and better illustrated in practice than in
theory. Lessons learned in the crucible cast important light on what it means to
be a government lawyer committed to the rule of law in international affairs.
Legal advisers engage in an endlessly interactive process between lawyers and
policymakers and between nations and international institutions. One fellow
legal adviser cogently called the government lawyer's fundamental duties:
"Fearless advice; Loyal implementation." 98 Through what I have called in my
academic work, "transnational legal process," legal doctrine and rules
transform from abstraction to reality. 99 Law influences policy, policy makes
law, and that perpetual feedback loop helps explain how government lawyers
help their nations obey international law.
Foreign policy decisions most fully conform with international law when
international lawyers are "at the table" while important decisions are being
made. If international relations are to be more than just power politics,
international lawyers must fuse their training and skill with moral fortitude and
guide the evolution of transnational legal process with the application of
reasoned and respect-worthy legal norms. By having the courage to argue with
their clients and counterparts, to invoke illegality when appropriate; and to
offer creative legal solutions that enable better policy options, legal advisers
help defend their countries when challenged while at the same time helping
those countries to live up to their own best standards and principles. to But as
they sit at the decision-making table, legal advisers are both strengthened and
disciplined by knowing that they will be expected to discharge the nation's
Duty to Explain the legal rationale for its actions and can expect to be held
accountable for those public explanations.
98. See Alan Kessel, former Canadian Legal Adviser, Remarks at 2015 British Institute of
International and Comparative Law Conference (Feb. 26, 2015) (described in note t supra).
99. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law
Home, 35 HOUs. L. REV. 623, 626 (1998); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB.
L. REV. 181 (1996).
100. As Abe Chayes once put it, there is "nothing wrong" with a lawyer-whether inside or
outside of govemment--"holding the United States to its own best standards and principles." David E.
Rosenbaum, Abram Chayes, John Kennedy Aide, Dies at 77, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2000),
http://www.nytimes.corn/2000/04/18/us/abram-chayes-john-kennedy-aide-dies-at-77.html.
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